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Detailed Terms
The MIT Faculty has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. However, we consider our conceptual specificity and tight operationalization of dehumanization to be a feature of our research, not a bug. Our definition (2) fails to capture "all forms of dehumanization" as it has been used colloquially and in prior research. But that is because dehumanization research has been muddled by overly broad and imprecise definitions that potentially confound distinguishable psychological processes (3). For example, while Fincher et al.
(1) state that "humanness involves more than just thinking and feeling," they never provide a clearly specified definition for the psychological processes that constitute dehumanization. It is not enough to state that dehumanization occurs when people refer to others as "pigs," "brutes," and "snakes." These are behavioral outputs of an underlying psychological process, not the psychological process itself. While comparisons to animals and body parts may reflect the denial of human attributes, they may also reflect insults intended to shame and humiliate victims that require the recognition of human attributes (what is the point of taunting someone by calling them a rat if you actually think they are one?) (4-7).
We agree with Fincher et al.
(1) that studies of atrocities should examine both attributions of animal essences and mental state denial. But teasing these processes apart and understanding the distinct role that dehumanization plays in conflict can only be accomplished with the kind of conceptual specificity and "narrow" scientific operationalizations that Fincher et al. are arguing against. Only by specifying and limiting the psychological mechanisms that comprise dehumanization can progress be made. For example, our model (2) predicts that dehumanization may be most important for indirect, structural violence against strangers that is enabled by indifference rather than direct, personal violence in existing relationships that is motivated by antipathy. It also raises new questions about how dynamic instrumental and moral motivational processes are before, during, and after an aggressive act (8) (9) (10) .
Fincher et al.
(1) close their commentary by suggesting that we must incorporate "the full complexities of . . . dehumanization" by "mapping different forms of dehumanization to different classes of outcomes" to "capture the inhumanity in denying humanity." But collapsing mental state denial, mental state recognition, comparisons to animals, and "a depraved moral sensibility" together within the category of dehumanization creates a confusing map with fuzzy borders. Drawing precise boundaries around distinguishable entities is the best guide for future research and reveals that some of the worst atrocities originate from the recognition, rather than the denial, of humanity.
